26/11 never again

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It's a recurring nightmare: Mumbai is under siege, hundreds of people are being held hostage, and I wake up morning after morning asking the same question...is it over yet? Is it over Yet? Is It Over Yet?

But while the last commando and the last hostage may have left the scene, and the last burnt tile or broken door been replaced months ago, the truth is 'Mumbai' will not be over until we are able to squarely face what happened to us during those three days.

In the next couple of weeks, we will look closely at all that we found out in the year since the Mumbai attacks - why our intelligence failed, where the investigations have led, why more has not been done by Pakistan to catch the guilty. And victim-by-victim we will trace the families of those that suffered, and find out where they are today.

As a nation, one year since 26/11 will be a day to come together to remember those that died but closure cannot, must not come to us until we are able to say - this will not happen again. Terrorists can, and probably will strike again - but we need to be able to say the failures of those three days will never be repeated.

To begin with the failure of our first response at the Centre. During the IC-814 hijacking, the failure to deploy the NSG to Amritsar became a critical error. Frustration at the spectre of men armed and ready to stop the plane on the tarmac, but sitting instead in a bus waiting for orders that never came. Once IC-814 took off for Pakistan, terrorists won the advantage, and eventually achieved their aim of freeing some of the sub-continent's most dangerous men at Kandahar.

"Never again", we said.

Yet yes, once again, during the Mumbai attacks the same frustration rose. The '24/7 perennially-prepared' NSG commando force was only pressed into action 3 hours after the first shot rang out at Leopold, and no one has yet borne the blame for why they couldn't find a plane big enough to take them, why men headquartered within ten minutes off Delhi airport took another 6 hours to reach Mumbai, and why when they landed there they weren't choppered to the scene, but put on slow buses.

In any attack, especially one involving hostages- everyone knows that the best time to counter-strike is pre-dawn. The terrorists are at their lowest ebb in terms of strength, and if they try to escape, it is easier to catch them as the sun rises. That's why in most fidayeen operations in Jammu and Kashmir (and also the GHQ in Rawalpindi) troops will surround the location, lay a siege, but only strike just before first light. In the first 24 hours our failure to deploy in time cost us the crucial part of that night, but what was our excuse to do it night after night, three dawns in all? The new NSG hubs will help now, but it is quick decision making that will really make the difference.

When they did try to storm, it was 36 hours later, in broad daylight. TV channels were roundly criticised for airing video of MARCOS (marine commandos) being airlifted onto the tops of Nariman House and for giving away commando-locations at the Taj and Trident, but really, when people miles around could see them with the naked eye, did televising the ham-handed operations really jeopardise them?

The next failure, in my mind the most serious one, was our failure to turn off the terrorists' communication with their leaders in Pakistan. A chilling Channel 4 documentary that pieced together those conversations shows very clearly how much the attackers depended on their Lashkar Commanders for every move, and even the strength to carry on.

At one point a commander believed to be Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi speaks to one of the dying terrorists, exhorting him to kill "at least 10-12" more people before he finally passes out. From throwing grenades, to setting hotel carpets afire, to which hostages to kill, every order came down those satellite/VOIP phones. For all our might as a technologically sophisticated nation - it was that basic communication that defeated us. (The government's decision to ban primitive pre-paid mobile connections in Kashmir, when clearly controls are needed on more advanced modes of communication, baffles even more, as a result)

From that failure, to the failure of our agencies to coordinate operations, to the credit-claiming press conferences even while operations continued, to the abysmal quality of the bullet proof jackets that failed our bravest officers, each piece in the Mumbai operation fits a shameful puzzle - and a pattern of larger incompetence.

The best part, the part that makes our chests swell with pride, and our throats choke with sadness, is about the individual courage of men and women who went beyond their training, beyond their calling, to respond the way they did. A victory of collective stories of heroism, but not of decisive operational strategy that befits a nation. This is the bitter truth we must face - both Vinita Kamte and Kavita Karkare have said that they don't want their husbands made martyrs if that in any way covers-up the systemic failures that led to their death.

Finally there is the haunting question each of us has to answer in the privacy of our own thoughts. If we were taken hostage today, how would we respond? Would we be among dozens who were simply led away by a couple of men at-a-time to our deaths, or would we risk our own lives with the hope that others may be spared? During the 9/11 attacks, the passengers of United Airlines Flt 93 showed that it is possible for ordinary people like you and me to do extraordinary things. Things we must be prepared to do - given that terror groups will always target the ordinary innocent.

Eventually, the war against terrorism, against violent extremism is won in the mind of each of our citizens - a battle our pluralistic democracy is more capable of winning than others are. It is those citizens that we let down with our failures on the ground during those three days in Mumbai - and those that we need to convince when we say "Never again".