Count the bodies, but don't move on

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Let this debate, not settle in the light of facts, analysis and reports.

Among the many headlines today, one struck me, "Ye dhokha hai, countrymen killed my brother". A sentiment that's at the centre of this divide, at the heart of this conflict. Who's ambushing whom? Who are we fighting? Is it a people's movement, is it a guerilla group, is it an ideological splinter fighting for tribal rights and social equity or is it a grass-root movement working towards empowerment?

Am not so sure if there is a simple answer.

The 76 who died aren't quiet far away from the thousands who ambushed.

They come from the same small-town India; their aspirations from a 6000-rupee salary are strikingly similar; a brick house that has to be made pucca, a younger sister who has to be married off, an ailing father who has to be helped in tilling the land. These aspirations have already been buried with one phone call, your son is dead and his body arrives 9 pm tonight. Once the rituals are over, their families will mourn, but India would have moved on. After all any offensive brings it with the risk of body bags and this battle is no different.

The trouble is this battle is different. It's a battle where the enemy is known, even sympathised with. It's a battle where no one denies the lot of the discriminated needs to improve and fast. Yet it's a battle where the opponents don't have land but have so easily acquired AK-47s, It's a battle where solutions however complex and complicated are achievable. It's a battle we have been talking about for the last five years.

So what is it about this ambush that's shocked us all? The fact that a contingent of 80 was not just outnumbered, outwitted, but effectively could not stage any retaliation needs to be looked at carefully. The after-effects of Dantewada are going to be felt in the days ahead, in the morale of the CRPF men, in the isolation of the nearby villages and perhaps in the renewed confidence of the Maoists.

Ask any military strategist and he'll tell you it's a classic insurgent ambush, a large Naxal force ensnares a CRPF contingent that was returning to base after three days of rigorous area domination. The trap was laid in a terrain ideal for such an operation, hillocks with dense jungles, the rebels had better intelligence, they tracked every movement of the force, meticulously planned the operation. They timed the strike perfectly, anticipated that a force returning from a grueling operation could let its guard down. A large IED sprung the ambush and then intense firing from dominating positions: the result maximum casualties and a non-existent counter attack.

The valour and sacrifice of these men need to be commended but the tears shouldn't drown what we are putting our men through. A lack of combat capacity and a stepping aside from operational procedures has been all too evident not just in Dantewada, but Silda and Koraput as well.

Again any soldier posted in the Northeast or Jammu & Kashmir would tell you counter-insurgency operations are small-unit tactical operations. Likely ambush sites and the enemy are almost scouted out by small groups. Once again in this dense terrain such a force will depend primarily on intelligence acquired by its own patrols.

The Naxals have certainly learnt their lessons far better in guerilla warfare. They were tactically superior that morning of April 6, perhaps even better motivated, disciplined and in some cases better equipped. It's no secret now that Maoists have also developed diverse expertise to clone sophisticated weapons, including assault rifles. This was noticed when a CRPF team busted an arms-manufacturing unit in the forests of Jharkhand and recovered a number of duplicate AK-47 and AK-57 rifles of very high standard.

Ironically even as the Maoists are able to manufacture look-alike AK-47 rifles, the preferred assault weapons for the soldier and the policeman in counter-insurgency environment is the INSAS rifle.

A casualty of 76 should not mean we push a force of 7,000 into the forests, hoping it would achieve the targets. There is an urgent need, to carry out reality checks of the overall level of training, equipping, planning and conduct of operations and setting realistic targets for our men. If this doesn't happen we would only be counting the next set of body bags and moving on.