I would be prez if Bhutto was PM: Musharraf

Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to Devil's Advocate and the second part of a special interview with the former President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf. Today I shall talk to him about Kargil - 2009 is of course the tenth anniversary of the Kargil Operation; as well as about the Government In Pakistan and his own future. General Musharaf, 2009, this month July is in fact the tenth anniversary of Kargil and I have been reading your memoirs Line of Fire very carefully - in particular Chapter 11 which deals with Kargil – and I notice that you don't deny the fact that the Pakistan army’s Rawalpindi Corps and the Force Command Northern Area were involved in the planning and execution. So are you today prepared to accept that the Pakistan army had a significant role in that operation?

Pervez Musharraf: No, no. They were Second Line forces and NLI - Northern Light Infantry, which holds the border all along. Now they are the part of Pakistan Army. Those days they were second line forces or NLI and they were the ones who were deployed all along the border except Siachen

Karan Thapar: Let me quote to you from page 91 of your memoirs, "On May the 15th I ordered FCNA (i.e. Force Command Northern Areas) to improve our defensive positions in co-ordination with the freedom fighters. By now the freedom fighters had occupied over 500 square miles of Indian occupied territory. Our field commanders were fully engaged in supporting them. We established outposts as eyes and ears and made raids and ambushes." That clearly suggests that the FCNA and the Rawalpindi Corps were involved, totally, with the so called freedom fighters.

Pervez Musharraf: Well whatever I have written I am not going to get into the details in this discussion - at all. That is final. Whatever I have written is final and the FCNA had under its command the NLI troops, which are second line troops.

Karan Thapar: But you are not revoking or going back on what you’ve written?

Pervez Musharraf: No, not at all.

Karan Thapar: So if the impression from Chapter 11 of your Memoirs is that the Rawalpindi Corps and FCNA played a critical role in the planning and execution of operation Kargil, you stand by that?

Pervez Musharraf: You must understand the arrangement. The Rawalpindi Corps has divisions under it and one of them is FCNA. FCNA had under it the NLI - the Northern Light Infantry - which is second line forces. Any where other than Siachen, it was NLI which was deployed, which are the second line forces

Karan Thapar: Let me come to some thing else which you have mentioned in that particular chapter on Kargil. At least in 2 places you say that the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif asked you for your advice whether he should declare a ceasefire, and on both the occasions you said to him that the decision was his. I quote what you write, "The military situation is favourable, the political decision has to be his”. But if the military situation was genuinely favourable, then why didn't you say to him - "No Prime Minister I am not for a ceasefire”. Why did you instead - forgive me putting it like this - beat about the bush and let him decide for himself?

Pervez Musharraf: No. I didn't beat about the bush. I am a military commander and I gave the military picture entirely - of the army, navy and air force.

Karan Thapar: But you also said to him that it was his decision to decide on the ceasefire.

Pervez Musharraf: ... The military situation certainly was very favourable, it was not supposedly favourable. Because if we are talking of India-Pakistan, Indians had moved all their forces against Kargil and there was weakness elsewhere. So we knew what the Indian forces are capable and what we are capable. I gave all that impression.

Karan Thapar: Assuming that's correct and I won't dispute it, others may, why then did you say to him that it's his decision, whether he has a ceasefire, why didn't you say to him instead - "look I have a very favourable military position, I am the army chief and my advice to you as my Prime Minister is, no there shouldn't be a cease fire". Why didn't you put it categorically?

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Pervez Musharraf: Well, I put it very very categorically and very clearly what the military position is, that it is favourable and there is no problem, in Kargil or in Kashmir or on the entire border. And that we were very capable of responding to any Indian Action.

Karan Thapar: Can I put this to you? Reading that chapter I get the impression of an army chief, who claims he has a favourable military position, who can achieve his targets and goals, and yet when the Prime Minister says he's considering a ceasefire, the army chief says "well it's your decision go ahead." That is like plucking defeat out of the jaws of victory.

Pervez Musharraf: No, not at all. One is the ground military position, the other is there is a lot happening internationally. Internationally there was the United States element - putting pressure on the government to stop or whatever. That also was happening. So there was international pressure, U.S. pressure and then the political situation. Whether the political situation was good enough to sustain that pressure...I therefore decided only to talk about the military (situation). That is all.

Karan Thapar: In other words, you are saying Militarily there was no need for a ceasefire, but politically, given the international pressure, given perhaps the weakness of the govt itself, the situation may have been different and there may have been a good case for ceasefire?

Pervez Musharraf: Now those are the decisions of the Prime Minister. What kind of pressure he can sustain and what is the political picture, he knows it better. I only talk of the military side and I told him there is no problem on the military side.

Karan Thapar: In other words, what you are also saying is the Prime Minister couldn't sustain the political pressure?

Pervez Musharraf: Well you can take it as you think. Yes.

Karan Thapar: Of the Kargil operation you write and I quote "considered purely in military terms the Kargil operations were a landmark in the history of the Pakistan army." Most people view Kargil as a failure, you see it as a success?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes, indeed. Yes it was a big success because it had impact even on the attitudes on the Indian side. How did we start discussing the Kashmir dispute? How was it that the Indians came that we will discuss Kashmir and there must be a negotiated settlement? Before this there was no such thing at all. Kashmir couldn't be spoken. Kashmir must not be mentioned even in United Nation speeches by our leaders. So this was the Indian stand. How did India come on the negotiating table on Kashmir?

Karan Thapar: So in other words, Kargil changed the Indian attitude and response?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes, many things (did). Kargil, the Mujahideen activity, the Indo-Pakistan confrontation every time - all that, yes. All that compounded and I think the Indian leadership then perceived that Pakistan is beyond coercion. It is beyond coercion, and therefore there has to be some political negotiated settlement of the dispute.

Karan Thapar: Let me put it like this, if you could re-live 1999, knowing that Kargil ended up raising question marks about you personally, about your country, and perhaps Kargil represented one of the most serious down-turns in India -Pakistan relations at that point, would you still repeat Kargil?

Pervez Musharraf: I don't want to comment. Those downturns happened. What happened when India came into Siachen, where was the downturn then? We don't think of that. What happened in 1971, when India was supporting Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan and made Bangladesh? So lets close this chapter. We have to understand that Pakistan and India have all along been on a confrontationist course. We fought wars and we fought several actions. Our intelligence organisations are always confronting each other and do harm to each other. So when we take isolated incidents (like) what happened to that Indian consulate in Kabul. Well this is a continuation of all that happens, of what we are doing to each other everywhere. So you can not take Kargil (otherwise) I would like to take Siachen, I would like to take East Pakistan, we would like to take the two wars. We have to stop maligning each other. We have done enough harm to each other. If we want to go on the course of peace, we need to resolve disputes. Now that is where we stand and Pakistan has its own honour and dignity to be guarded. That is what I always say - don't try to dominate or don't try to affect our sovereignty as a country.

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Karan Thapar: Let me then end this particular bit about Kargil by reading the last sentence of Chapter 11 on Kargil in your memoirs Line of Fire. "I would like to state emphatically, that what ever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir, is due considerably to the Kargil conflict." You stand by that?

Pervez Musharraf: Of course, I have written it.

Karan Thapar: Even though to most that sounds contradictory, if not untrue, you stand by that?

Pervez Musharraf: This is one of the contributing factors certainly, yes.

Karan Thapar: General Musharaf Steven Hadley the former American National Security Advisor said that after you stepped down first as Army Chief and then as President, Pakistan has become more complicated and a more difficult country. Do you agree?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes it has, lots of complications, political, economic, and law and order.

Karan Thapar: And has the government, holding the country together, become weaker as well?

Pervez Musharraf: Well at this moment yes, it's confronting a lot of problems certainly

Karan Thapar: It is weaker?

Pervez Musharraf: Well...

Karan Thapar: Go on say it.

Pervez Musharraf: (Laughs)...yes....

Karan Thapar: It is weaker?

Pervez Musharraf: I think at this moment, yes.

Karan Thapar: Let me ask you a few blunt questions? Where does the centre of power lie in Pakistan today - with the Presidency or Army Headquarters?

Pervez Musharraf: Centre of Power is always with the government. Its a misperception that army keeps dictating terms to the government. The army does every thing that the Government tells them to do. It's only when Pakistan is at stake and Pakistan is suffering, then only army comes in and tries to moderate or improve the situation.

Karan Thapar: President Obama has said that the civilian government in Pakistan and I am quoting, "is very fragile and doesn't seem to have the capacity to deliver basic services."

Pervez Musharraf: Well at this moment yes, that is correct. That is happening if you see the electricity problem and there are (other) problems yes.

Karan Thapar: So President Zardari's position is fragile?

Pervez Musharraf: At this moment - politically - indeed yes.

Karan Thapar: To what extent is his position weakened or diminished by the fact that increasingly people in Pakistan see the Prime Minister as a rival centre of power?

Pervez Musharraf: No, I would not like to comment on it. They have the Prime Minister and the President from the same party - from the People's Party - and I am not involved in their private differences.

Karan Thapar: But if they are from the same party and there is rivalry emerging between them, then clearly that can't be a sign of health?

Pervez Musharraf: Again I don't know what is the rivalry and I don't have information of what their differences are.

Karan Thapar: What about the rivalry between Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif? Given that Pakistan's democracy is still fledgling, is this a sign of health or is this rivalry a cause of concern?

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Pervez Musharraf: No, I think there is confusion alright whether they are in opposition, whether the PML (N) is in opposition or part of government, (whether) they are together or against. There is a degree of confusion in that.

Karan Thapar: Only confusion?

Pervez Musharraf: Well confusion and obviously they are two different parties (and) they have there own way of looking at things.

Karan Thapar: And they are pulling in different directions? Is it de-stabilising the situation in Pakistan?

Pervez Musharraf: At this moment, I would say yes, because the focus ought to be on fighting terrorism and extremism. That ought to be the focus because that is the greatest danger...

Karan Thapar: And this rivalry undermines that focus.

Pervez Musharraf: ...and that requires total political will and political co-operation and co-operation between the federal government, the provincial government and the army. The unity of command of this. So that the people of Pakistan, and the people of Pakistan are represented by the political parties, they have to be together.

Karan Thapar: In this situation where the political parties clearly aren't together and their rivalry is destabilising the country, what are the chances of another military take over?

Pervez Musharraf: No, I would not like to comment on that.

Karan Thapar: Are you ruling it out?

Pervez Musharraf: No comments, no comments

Karan Thapar: That's a very interesting answer - no comments. I specifically asked - are you ruling it out, and you don't want to say that you are ruling it out!

Pervez Musharraf: No, no. Army has to ensure the integrity - territorial integrity and security of Pakistan. So its entirely the army's decision and the Chief's decision. But (so far) they go along with the government. And I wouldn't like to comment. These are sensitive issues

Karan Thapar: I just want to point out for the audience that, twice or thrice, I asked you if you are ruling out another military take over and your answer was you don't want to comment.

Pervez Musharraf: Well, yes. These are sensitive issues and I don't want to comment.

Karan Thapar: These are sensitive issues and you don't want to comment. In other words anything could happen?

Pervez Musharraf: No comments, no comments Karan.

Karan Thapar: Lets turn briefly to yourself, when you resigned as President in August 2008, did you step down voluntarily or was there a sense in which you were pushed or eased out?

Pervez Musharraf: Well, a combination. The environment had become such that remaining a rubber stamp President with no...nothing to do - literally - was absolutely counterproductive and the political situation was evolving in a manner that my continuation was amiss, was purposeless.

Karan Thapar: So circumstances developed in such a way that you were gently eased out?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes but I took my own decision, yes, to leave.

Karan Thapar: Was there any understanding at that time - between the civilian government and the army - that you should be given indemnity or protection against future law suits and prosecution?

Pervez Musharraf: No, no I didn't get involved in any such understanding at all. I didn't get involved in any such understanding.

Karan Thapar: When you say you didn't get involved - does that mean that there also wasn't such an understanding or just you were not involved?

Pervez Musharraf: Not to my knowledge, not to my knowledge at all.

Karan Thapar: You mean there could be indemnity, but you are not aware of it?

Pervez Musharraf: I absolutely am not aware of it, and I don't know it.

Karan Thapar: Does it ever worry you that you might end up facing court action or law suits in Pakistan?

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Pervez Musharraf: Well I know that whatever I did was legally indemnified by the courts, by the assembly, so therefore...

Karan Thapar: Except that now the chief justice you removed is back in the saddle.

Pervez Musharraf: Yes.

Karan Thapar: So doesn't that worry you?

Pervez Musharraf: Well one has to face realities on ground, and I'll face them.

Karan Thapar: So you are aware that there could be trouble ahead, but you are going to face it?

Pervez Musharraf: Yeah. I am not a man who runs away from realities

Karan Thapar: You are prepared to face the law suits if they are brought against you?

Pervez Musharraf: Let them bring law suits and prove anything against me.

Karan Thapar: Two questions that always intrigue people. When one looks back at the cascading events that lead to your resignation, they all seem to have begun with the decision to dismiss the Chief Justice. Do you think in hindsight that was a mistake?

Pervez Musharraf: No, what happened after that was bad and that lead to lot of turmoil in Pakistan, certainly. But if you say whether that was a mistake? No. I took action which was absolutely constitutional and legal. A reference coming to me through the Ministry of Law, through the Prime Minister - the President constitutionally is obliged to take action on it. And I took absolutely legal and constitutional action, when I forwarded it to the Supreme Judicial Council.

Karan Thapar: So you stand by the decision to dismiss the chief justice?

Pervez Musharraf: Absolutely. It was the court which had to decide whether the reference sent by the Prime Minister to the President, and the President sends it constitutionally to the Supreme Judicial Council and it is the Supreme Judicial Council which had to decide.

Karan Thapar: Do you think even if the decision itself was correct, it could have been handled better?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes, the handling I would say was shabby. Handling of the Chief Justice was shabby.

Karan Thapar: Do you blame yourself?

Pervez Musharraf: No, I don't blame myself because I don't get into the nitty gritty of which Deputy Superintendent of Police was rude to him, some cars were taken or some thing of that sort. Now I am not passing such orders at all.

Karan Thapar: You think others should have handled it better, (that) the people who worked under you let you down?

Pervez Musharraf: Well, it was not merely the handling of the Chief Justice, it was the politicisation of the lawyers movement which did the damage and that was where the political parties entered the fray, came onto the streets, supported the lawyers and that was when things started going wrong.

Karan Thapar: A second question that intrigues people is, was there any understanding or agreement between you and Benazir Bhutto that facilitated her return in October 2007?

Pervez Musharraf: There was an understanding... I talked to her, yes. I had been talking with her twice. She was not supposed to come back before the elections.

Karan Thapar: She broke that and came back?

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Pervez Musharraf: Yes, she came back.

Karan Thapar: So there was talk, there was an understanding and she broke the understanding to come back in October 2007?

Pervez Musharraf: Yes, absolutely.

Karan Thapar: Would you say that if she had not broken that understanding and had fulfilled whatever terms and agreement you are hinting at you had with her, she would have lived?

Pervez Musharraf: I think so, I think so, absolutely. She would have lived.

Karan Thapar: One last question, if Benazir Bhutto had lived to become Prime minister again would General Pervez Musharaf still be President of Pakistan?

Pervez Musharraf: I think, I would have been, yes.

Karan Thapar: So you had a good working understanding with her, which you didn't have thereafter with her husband?

Pervez Musharraf: Well yes. I did hold negotiations and she was supposed to come later. And whether she would have been Prime Minister or not, it was (upto) the electorate whether her party would have won the election - these are things which is all conjecture that we are doing – but if she did get elected and she did become Prime Minister, I would have continued as the president, because I was elected by the Parliament, so this would have continued.

Karan Thapar: Did Asif Zardari deliberately choose not to honour whatever understanding or agreement you had with Benazir Bhutto, or was he unaware of it?

Pervez Musharraf: Well, I wouldn't like to get involved in whatever happened...turmoil happened...

Karan Thapar: Is there any hurt in your heart, any anger in your heart against Asif Ali Zardari?

Pervez Musharraf: No comments, no comments. Lets see (laughs)

Karan Thapar: What does lets see mean?

Pervez Musharraf: I don't want to comment. I don't want to get involved in differences with anyone

Karan Thapar: General Musharraf, a pleasure talking to you.

Pervez Musharraf: Thank you, thank you very much